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COMMENTARY*
C. ROBERT MORRIS**

This criticism of law school curricula brought to my mind another
kind of criticism-the great revolution called "legal realism" that swept
our profession beginning in the early part of this century. One of the
things that must be realized is that most judges sitting today had their
legal education after that revolution was well under way. Insofar as
legal education could have any effect, they started their professional
lives as legal realists.
Now the early legal realists, when they were criticizing the doctrinaire courts of yore, had a relatively easy task; for the opinions they
criticized were written by men from the previous century. It was easy,
then, to point out that the courts were valuing logical symmetry too
highly and not paying enough attention to the realm of action-to the
functional consequences of the rules of law. After all, the judges had
been trained as students in the 19th century, to think of law as primarily
a body of concepts.
One would have hoped that by now things would have changed, and
that legal realists would not be able to find as much to criticize in contemporary opinions; but recent judges trained by legal realists seem
almost as subject to the same kind of criticism as their predecessors were.
I take it that this is because judges are, in some sense, habitual creatures,
and that this year's judges understand their jobs to be successors to last
year's judges. They have, therefore, adopted the mode of their predecessors in spite of their training.
My point is that this is true of law professors, too. The conception of
our job that Mr. Mooney criticized is one that we have because we are,
in some sense, imitators of the professors we had when we were students.
We must imitate them to a considerable degree, whether we want to or
not. Indeed, we come into the profession of teaching law primarily because we find it attractive, and the "it" which attracts us is what we
saw our old professors doing when we were students.
For instance, our student-teacher ratio, which we are stuck with,
and which our predecessors were stuck with, leads to a certain kind of
education which, in spite of its deficiencies, we are satisfied to practice.
We feel that our students ought to do something active, because being a
lawyer is lawyering; but with the mass of students that we have in front
of us, what can we require them to do? The only thing we have time for
them to do is to call upon them to recite and "make a noise like a law* Presented at the Round Table on Curriculum of the American Association of Law
Schools, Washington, D.C., December 28, 1966.
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yer." Of course, lawyers do not make noises that way, not good lawyers.
The student's recitation can only be a tentative first draft, and I take it
lawyering, good lawyering, is not merely first drafts. But a hasty first
draft is all that we expect of our students, both in class and in examinations. In class, we give each recitation a quick critique, and move quickly
on to the next man, because we have a lot of students to teach.
We call it the "socratic method" but it is not. Socrates never taught
that way, with eighty-three people seated in alphabetic order so that he
would know their names. We give it a Greek name to give it dignity, but
Greek names cover up the real meaning, to make the unacceptable more
acceptable. (Like the "Oedipus Complex," which in simpler more
straightforward language would simply be obscene.)
But we are content with this, and we envy the 16-to-1 student
teacher ratio at Yale, which is still atrocious, when compared to the
ratio in any other post-graduate education or in most good undergraduate
institutions. But if we improve the ratio, can we take advantage of the
change? Isn't it true that most of us enjoy teaching in this way, and if
assigned a smaller class, we would not change our methods? We came
to law faculties to do what our old professors did. That is what we want
to do. A change to smaller classes, with its opportunities for assigning
written work to be critiqued and rewritten, will not accomplish very
much because we want to teach in the good old way-we will not take
full advantage of the change.
I was struck by the statement that most torts teachers and contracts
teachers are tenured. That is another way of saying that we are stuck
with ourselves. Any improvements must be our improvements. But "it
has always been that way." Well, some things always have to be that
way. You can't change everything at once; no one is willing to. Those
who would be willing would be thought a bit mad. So only a few things
can be done at a time.
I was attracted by Professor Kelso's case knife aproach-the way
he was going to use fictions to do this-to cause us to have some changes
that we might not admit we were having. We weren't going to teach a
course in torts. We could call it torts, but it would be a course in values.
Call it contracts but teach legal institutions. Thus is born the legaleducation-fiction.
Now I have been on curriculum committees for a long time, and I
have been impressed with curriculum committees as political organizations. Can one change legal education by manipulating the curriculum?
I have tried it a couple of times, and there is no way of telling whether
one has accomplished anything when one has changed a curriculum. The
curriculum is not the law school, and faculties are not likely to change

19671

LEGAL EDUCATION

much of what they do merely because the courses have new labels. As a
matter of fact, if we try to make them change very much, they will talk
about academic freedom and the teacher's prerogatives, and you are not
going to get the courses taught differently. I was told a little while ago
about a professor whose courses were Procedure I, Procedure II, and
an advanced course called Oil and Gas. But the students called his
courses Oil and Gas I, Oil and Gas II, and Oil and Gas III.
So, I get to the conclusion that Professor Mooney's position really
means that we need a new kind of professor. It is a problem for the
personnel committee, not the curriculum committee. Well, I don't think
many of us are going to resign. If we did, I don't know who would come
in to take our place. I shudder to think.
And as Professor Mooney pointed out, we are imbalanced in our
approach-all these "wealth" courses. Of course we are imbalanced. The
law is of life, but it is not life itself. It has a peculiar approach to life.
By contrast, Medicine is about life too. It may be about all aspects of
man, but most of medicine is about guts and sickness, clearly a one-sided
approach.
The fact is, that while we are very good, or we profess to be very
good, at criticizing social institutions and suggesting methods for their
reform; much of what I have heard here, and what I have heard generally on this topic, has not been a good job of using our skills. The law
school is also a social institution, consisting of individuals who have their
roots in peculiar backgrounds, and serving a group of students with particular goals. The students come to learn those skills which will help
them make a living. Of course they are interested in the problems of
wealth. They will serve clients with money problems. We may not admire
them, because they come to us only to learn to make money. We cannot
really understand our students: they came to law school to get out; we
came to stay.
But the institution includes both them and us. And how you go
about reforming this kind of institution is a difficult problem. We are in
the business of studying how institutions are manipulated. Can we make
such a study of law schools and use our skills as manipulators of social
institutions to reform legal education? If we try, we will be involved in
using our skills for ourselves. And the lawyer who pleads his own case
has a fool for a client; but that is the position I am afraid that we are in.

